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The Palestine-Israel Conflict in the U.S. Courtroom
Bryen left the Senate Foreign Relations Committee less than a year after the investigation ended and became executive director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. The institute coupled pro-Israeli militarism and anti-Soviet defense policies into strong arguments for close U.S.-Israeli economic and strategic cooperation. In 1981, the Reagan Administration appointed Bryen to the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy with the responsibility of insuring that advanced U.S. technology was not getting into the hands of the Soviet Union. In 1985, however, Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Bryen gave a seminar for Israeli businessmen at the Israeli Embassy on the topic of security and technology transfer from the U.S. to Israel.4 The NAAA recently has brought another lawsuit against the Justice Department in an attempt to force it to release other pertinent documents, still labeled as classified, on Bryen. Partners in Repression: Ziad Abu Eain v. Wilkes Two years of sitting in a Chicago prison cell abruptly ended late one Saturday afternoon for Ziad Abu Eain, a 21-year-old Palestinian, when U.S. marshals and prison guards secreted him to a plane and into the hands of Israeli authorities waiting in New York. Ziad’s American defense lawyers learned of his removal hours later. Ziad was beaten on his way back to Israel. In the week that followed, an injunction had to be secured forbidding the Israeli military from demolishing the Abu Eain family home—a form of collective punishment routinely practiced in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. In the months that followed, Ziad was tried and found guilty—solely on the confession of another Palestinian who had recanted his testimony—of a crime he persistently denied committing. He was sentenced to life in prison. In April 1985, Ziad returned to his home town of Ramallah as part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and PLO forces. In a similar exchange, under International Red Cross auspices two years prior, Israel had broken its promise and refused to release Ziad with the other prisoners. Even though Ziad now resides at home, U.S. extradition law remains irreparably altered. Prior to Ziad’s case, U.S. courts firmly had abided by the “political offense exception” doctrine of extradition law. That canon held that governments would extradite individuals wanted for common criminal crimes, not political activities. The distinction reflected a philosophical compromise, arising from the wake of the French Revolution, self-preservation and the people’s right to resist an unjust regime. The doctrine’s underlying policy rationale was that an individual should not be returned to his native land to undergo a trial prejudiced by political considerations. Moreover, the exception allowed nations to avoid entanglements in the internal affairs of other states and prevented them from indirectly aiding and supporting repression in another country.5 It has been a hallmark of Western jurisprudence. The United States Government affirmed its historic commitment to human rights and liberty by adhering to the political offense exception doctrine in its extradition treaties. But as political violence by national liberation groups in the early 1970s surged, the U.S. State Department eased its support for the doctrine. Opposition crystallized when a federal court in California refused to extradite an admitted member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to face charges of attempted murder in connection with the bombing of a military barracks in England.6 The San Francisco magistrate considered the offense political and therefore nonextraditable. The State Department decried the decision, publicly warning that the U.S. would become a haven for terrorists, and claimed that overseas, the decision appeared to put the stamp of approval on terrorist activities. Ironically, the United Nations, a few years prior, had signaled similar support for the U.S. magistrate’s decision when it refused to accept a U.S. proposal to ban the political offense exception doctrine. Within six months, however, the U.S. Government was presented with the opportunity to overturn the California decision and erase the political exception rule from U.S. extradition law. The issue centered around Israel’s request that Ziad Abu Eain be extradited to stand trial for allegedly planting a bomb in Israel, killing two people. Arrested in Chicago by the FBI in August 1979, pursuant to Israel’s extradition request, Ziad adamantly denied having any connection with the bombing. Contrary to Israel’s charge that he fled to the U.S. to escape arrest, Ziad had traveled to Chicago on a non-immigrant visa at the request of his sister to help resolve some marital problems. Not only had Ziad remained in Ramallah for nearly three weeks after the bombing, but he had also successfully passed a series of security investigations by Israeli military authorities and the U.S. Consulate prior to being granted his American visa. On May 14, the day he allegedly planted the bomb, his sister-in-law gave birth to her fourth child. With his brother visiting his wife in the hospital and his father on a business trip to the Gaza Strip, Ziad worked alone in the family’s small home appliance store. Later that day when word spread that his sister-in-law had borne a healthy baby boy, friends and neighbors dropped by the store to congratulate Ziad and share the customary food and drink to celebrate the birth. Thirteen people signed affidavits swearing that Ziad had tended store in Ramallah all day or visited his sister-in-law in the hospital that evening.
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