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The U.S. Role in Israel's Arms Industry
To obtain concessions from U.S. companies, “particularly where technology is involved," Israel has actively tied its purchases of military equipment from these companies to their willingness to share their technology with Israel.51 In most cases, commercial agreements between a U.S. firm and Israel specify the rent-free use of the vendor’s equipment for production in Israel, waiver of R&D costs, the delivery of simulation packages, and lists of parts and suppliers. For example, Israel purchased Litton’s LW-33 weapons delivery system for the F-4E and RF-4E contingent upon a phased program of technology assistance and know-how to qualify IAI as a prime subcontractor with work equal to 25 percent of the total contract. Similarly, in purchasing the Samson rocket-powered gliding decoy from Celesco Industries (since named Brunswick), Israel insisted on the transfer of the technology data and threatened to halt other contracts unless the U.S. State Department approved the manufacture of components in Israel.52 Although permission was originally refused, the U.S. subsequently lost interest in the decoy and Israel was allowed to take over the technology involved. It went on to produce the Samson drones whose performance in the Lebanon war was such that in February 1984, the U.S. purchased the weapon itself.53 Although few restrictions have been placed on Israel’s ability to acquire U.S. technology, the special relationship, between Israel and the U.S., during the last few years, has been shaken by scandals involving Israelis or their friends attempting to smuggle U.S. technology. In 1985, the U.S. Government indicted Richard Smyth of Milco International for illegally exporting, between 1979 and 1983, 810 nuclear triggering devices, known as krytons. These krytons, used in weapons research and as timing mechanisms in firing medical lasers, can act as triggers for nuclear explosions.54 Israel has insisted that the krytons were used in laser-related conventional weapons and claimed that they were not aware that Milco International had not acquired the proper exporting licenses.55 Once again in relation to Israel, U.S. customs agents, in December 1985, raided three American companies involved in illegal sales of electoplating technology and machinery used to improve 120-mm tank gun barrels.56 This new technology would have considerably improved the accuracy and durability of these tank cannon barrels.57 The following year, the U.S. conducted an investigation to determine whether Israeli Air Force officers had attempted to steal restricted optical technology from Recon Optical, Inc., the world’s leading manufacturer of aerial reconnaissance systems for the military.58 Recon Optical officials, in a federal suit filed in New York, cited an attempt by three Israeli military officers to remove 50,000 pages of technical documents from the company’s plant. The officers had been assigned to monitor the reconnaissance system being developed for Israel at the plant. The contract between Recon Optical and Israel called for acquisition of the table-sized system hardware but not for the technology used.59 Various attempts to steal sensitive U.S. technology have been directly and indirectly connected with Israel’s military procurement office in New York. According to investigators at the U.S. Justice Department, Customs Services and the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control, “Israel has often used its New York procurement office [which employs nearly 200 military and technical experts]60 ...to sneak U.S. weapons technology past U.S. authorities.”61 In response, the U.S. has on few occasions subpoenaed members of the Israeli purchasing mission for questioning about alleged Israeli attempts to obtain American technology illegally. On one occasion, an Israeli purchasing agent was arrested by police on the roof of the building housing the Bigger Byte Computer Co. and Relli Technology. The Israeli consulate subsequently announced that the Israeli agent, Ronen Tidhar, “did it on his own private time”62 Since members of Israel’s military purchasing mission hold diplomatic passports, they could not be charged or summoned for questioning.63 The transfer of technology to Israel remains a sensitive issue in the U.S. government. On one hand, President Reagan and his top aides have continuously and publicly pledged U.S. support to preserve Israel’s “qualitative edge over its potential adversaries.” At the same time, U.S. has denied Israel access to technology in a number of areas, “which grow as classes of technology spread its [sic] tentacles,” according to a military analyst.64 The few limitations imposed on the transfer of U.S. military technology to Israel may be attributed to a combination of factors. One limitation, the suspension of certain technologies, particularly those associated with the production of cluster bombs, was imposed following Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. This suspension was never lifted. The second involves a general U.S. tightening of procedures because of the fear that information might reach Soviet hands. The third relates to the Jonathan Pollard affair, the U.S. Navy analyst who admitted to spying for Israel under the supervision of a special Israeli intelligence unit.65
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